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TRASH, THERMAL IMAGERS, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
THE NEW SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Jennifer Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
MAGINE this scenario: you just arrived home from a long, yet typi-
cal day at work. You sit down for dinner with your family. At the
dinner table, you converse with your family about the events of the
day and discuss the tasks that need to be completed tomorrow. After
dinner, as usual, you take out the trash and leave it at the curb.
After you tuck your kids into bed, you lay down in bed next to your
spouse. In the darkness, you hear the whir of a helicopter directly above
your home. Naturally, you are curious about what is happening outside.
In the darkness, you stumble to the bedroom window.
You are shocked to observe members of the local police force rummag-
ing through your garbage, undoubtedly dredging up intimate details of
your private life and habits. You feel outraged and violated as you watch
the police cart off your garbage in their squad cars.
After all, your trash speaks volumes about your identity. According to
Supreme Court precedent, however, such search and seizure of trash dis-
carded outside the curtilage of a home is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.' A vehement dissent written by Justice Brennan in that
case recognized:
A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and
recreational habits of the person who produced it. A search of trash,
like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual
practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk
drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can
divulge the target's financial and professional status, political affilia-
tions and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and
romantic interests. It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag
harbors telling evidence of the "intimate activity associated with the
'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"' which the
* J.D., Southern Methodist University School of Law, 2000; B.A., Southern Method-
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1. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
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Fourth Amendment is designed to protect.2
Unbeknownst to you, the helicopter looming above your home is also
using a Forward Looking Infra Red Device ("FLIR"), a thermal imager,
to detect heat emanations from bodies and from other objects in your
home. The FLIR allows the police to detect differences in the surface
temperatures of targeted objects in your home.3 Because it is being used
at night, the FLIR displays sources of heat in your home as shades of
white and cooler temperatures in your home as shades of gray.4 With the
FLIR, the police are able to, in effect, see through the walls of your
home. In 1994, the Washington Supreme Court recognized that:
[a FLIR] can detect a human form through an open window when
the person is leaning against a curtain, and pressing the curtain be-
tween the window screen and his or her body. [A FLIR] can also
detect the warmth generated by a person leaning against a relatively
thin barrier such as a plywood door.5
A FLIR allows the police:
[t]o draw specific inferences about the inside of [a home]. When di-
rected at a home, the infrared device allows the officer to determine
which particular rooms a homeowner is heating, and thus using, at
night. This information may reflect a homeowner's financial inability
to heat the entire home, the existence and location of energy con-
suming and heat producing appliances, and possibly even the num-
ber of people who may be staying at the residence on a given night.
The device discloses information about activities occurring within the
confines of the home, and which a person is entitled to keep from
disclosure absent a warrant. 6
According to some courts, warrantless infrared surveillance with a
FLIR does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 7 However, the Supreme
Court has not yet addressed this issue. 8
In disbelief, you think that this really cannot be happening to you.
These intrusions by the police proceed without a warrant and without
probable cause to believe that you or your family were engaged in any
criminal activity whatsoever. 9 Like most citizens of the United States,
2. Id. at 50-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 180 (1984)).
3. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (holding that infrared
surveillance without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and Article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution).
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 598.
7. See United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995-97 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp.
220, 223-24 (D. Haw. 1991).
8. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on this issue. See United States v.
Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Kyllo v. United States, No. 99-8508, 2000
WL 267066 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000)
9. See HARRY t. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION ANI) DE-
FENSE FUNcriONs 69 (1993) (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires that probable
cause must exist in order to obtain a search warrant and to seize evidence).
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you believe that your home is a refuge of privacy away from the rest of
the world. In recognizing this principle, Justice Brennan of the Supreme
Court noted that "[t]he American society. . . 'chooses to dwell in reason-
able security and freedom from surveillance' and is more dedicated to
individual liberty and more sensitive to intrusions on the sanctity of the
home than the Court is willing to acknowledge." 10 The Supreme Court of
Washington has also recognized that "[h]omes enjoy a special status in
federal constitutional jurisprudence. '[T]he right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion' stands at the 'very core' of the Fourth Amendment."11 So, what
happened to your right to be let alone?
Welcome to the new dimension of search and seizure. It is a world of
ever-increasing technological sophistication where the police can monitor
your every move. If this scenario sounds too much like a scene plucked
from the movie Conspiracy Theory, then this is your wake-up call. In the
era of the "war on drugs," it can happen to you.
There is a great temptation to dismiss this scenario as downright
Orwellian. 12 In his novel, 1984, George Orwell described an eerily simi-
lar situation:
The black [mustached] face gazed down from every commanding
corner. There was one on the house immediately opposite. BIG
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the captain said .... In the far
distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for
an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows. 13
In a 1998 case involving clandestine video surveillance on private prop-
erty for the purpose of locating incriminating evidence, the supreme court
of Vermont held that such warrantless surveillance by the police was not
Since the purpose of the search warrant is to search for and seize evidence, instrumentali-
ties, fruits of a crime, or contraband, the warrant must specifically designate the items to be
seized, and the whereabouts of this material. For search warrants, the particularity re-
quirement safeguards the individual's privacy interest against a general exploratory rum-
maging. . . . The proposed search warrant is normally accompanied by an affidavit. The
affidavit must establish probable cause to believe that the property sought is related to the
crime being investigated, and that the property is at the place to be searched.
Id. (citations omitted).
10. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 56 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
11. Young, 867 P.2d at 601 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714 (1984) (holding that when the police use sense-enhancing devices to obtain infor-
mation from someone's home that could not be obtained by unaided observation of the
exterior, the police should have a search warrant).
12. Fifty-one years ago, George Orwell envisioned such a police state in his dreaded
novel about what he thought life would be like in the 1980s. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Florida v. Riley, a plurality of the Supreme
Court held that surveillance from a helicopter with the naked eye does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 450-52; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215
(1986) (holding that warrantless aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard was not a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment).
13. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1949).
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a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 14 A forceful dissenting
opinion, however, argued:
George Orwell's bleak and chilling vision of post-modern civilization
has not come to pass, at least not in this country. But allowing police
agents to set up surreptitious, twenty-four-hour video surveillance of
landowners on their own property without judicial oversight raises the
specter of such a society. Indeed, the use of technological advances to
enhance government surveillance techniques threatens to erode the ex-
pectations of privacy we take for granted in a free and open society. To-
day's decision undermines the lone bulwark against such erosion-[the]
warrant requirement.' 5
Thus far, warrantless infrared surveillance by helicopters and warrant-
less seizure of trash seem to be confined to the realm of drug smugglers.
Upon closer investigation, however, there is cause for concern that the
police and other law enforcement officials will abuse their power. A
commentator recently noted:
Due to developing surveillance and information technologies and the
merger of these technologies, the constitutional right to privacy cur-
rently does not coincide with individuals' interests in privacy. New
surveillance equipment allows surveillants to observe, without a
search warrant, that which most individuals consider private. This
surveillance technology, therefore, invades an individual's privacy in-
terest against intrusion without infringing upon his legal right to pri-
vacy. As such, advances in surveillance technology diminish the legal
right to privacy.' 6
For example, in a case involving warrantless infrared surveillance with
a FLIR on a number of private residences, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that such unlimited infrared surveillance violates the Fourth
Amendment. 17 The Supreme Court of Washington recognized:
If we were to hold the use of the [infrared] device does not constitute
a search, no limitation would be placed on the government's ability
to use the device on any private residence, on any particular night,
even if no criminal activity is suspected. Such police activity is con-
stitutionally offensive. 18
The court further argued:
Such unrestricted, sense-enhanced observations present a dangerous
amount of police discretion. This kind of surveillance avoids the pro-
tection of a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral magis-
trate. Not only does this practice eviscerate the traditional
requirement that police identify a particular suspect prior to initiat-
14. See State v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866 (Vt. 1998) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (denying the defendant's motion to suppress).
15. Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
16. Thomas B. Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Sur-
veillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 975, 1010 (1999).
17. See Young, 867 P.2d at 601.
18. Id. at 600. The police conducted thermal investigations not only on the defen-
dant's home, but on the homes of his neighbors as well. See id.
1648 [Vol. 53
THE NEW SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ing a search, but it also facilitates clandestine investigations by the
police force, which are not subject to the traditional restraint of pub-
lic accountability. Such secret surveillance may not only chill free
expression, but also may encourage arbitrary and inappropriate po-
lice conduct. 19
The Tenth Circuit also noted:
The science of investigation has progressed to the point where the
government can now divine useful data from clues so slight as to be
beyond the awareness of the average citizen. We do not think, how-
ever, that subtlety can uncover that which the Constitution undoubt-
edly shields from the less refined tools of days past. Use of a thermal
imager enables the government to discover that which is shielded
from the public by the walls of the home. We reject the govern-
ment's contention that its technical wizardry should free it from the
restraints mandated by the Fourth Amendment. 'Indiscriminate
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view
would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.'
We therefore hold that the government must obtain a warrant before
scanning a home with a thermal imager.20
If the courts sanction such warrantless searches will they open the door
for such searches to come to a neighborhood near you? If we merely
dismiss this issue as a "drug case," we do so at the peril of our own right
to privacy. A dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court recognized:
[Tihe plurality has allowed its analysis of [the defendant's] expecta-
tion of privacy to be colored by its distaste for the activity in which
[the defendant] was engaged. It is indeed easy to forget, especially in
view of current concern over drug trafficking, that the scope of the
Fourth Amendment's protection does not turn on whether the activ-
ity disclosed by a search is illegal or innocuous. But we dismiss this
as a 'drug case' only at the peril of our own liberties. Justice Frank-
furter once noted that '[it is a fair summary of history to say that the
safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies
involving not very nice people,' and nowhere is this observation
more apt than in the area of the Fourth Amendment, whose words
have necessarily been given meaning largely through decisions sup-
pressing evidence of criminal activity. The principle enunciated in
this case determines what limits the Fourth Amendment imposes on
aerial surveillance of any person, for any reason. If the Constitution
does not protect [the defendant] . .. against such surveillance, it is
hard to see how it will prohibit the government from aerial spying on
the activities of a law-abiding citizen on her fully enclosed outdoor
patio .... 'The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds
before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline
ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)




of surveillance if we do not.' 21
The dissenting opinion further noted:
The interest [protected by the Fourteenth Amendment] is the expec-
tation of the ordinary citizen, who has never engaged in illegal con-
duct in his life, that he may carry on his private discourse freely,
openly, and spontaneously .... Interposition of a warrant require-
ment is designed not to shield 'wrongdoers,' but to secure a measure
of privacy and a sense of personal security throughout our society.22
The difficult task for courts addressing this situation is to forge a deli-
cate balance between two competing interests and concerns. Where is
the middle ground between using advanced technological innovations to
eliminate the danger of drugs from our streets and preserving our funda-
mental right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment? Do we really
want to grant the police the right to use such increasingly sophisticated
technological tools without a warrant to combat criminals in the "war on
drugs" if it will mean sacrificing our right to privacy? At what point do
we tread lightly on the coverage of the Fourth Amendment to eliminate
the danger of drugs from our streets and at what point do we trample the
protections against warrantless search offered by the Fourth Amend-
ment?2 3 Should citizens of the United States be relegated to passively
watching their right to privacy erode in the name of the "war on drugs"?
The Fourth Amendment might not protect you from warrantless searches
of your trash and from warrantless infrared surveillance with a FLIR.24
In fact, even shredding or burning will not ensure the privacy of your
trash.25
In United States v. Ishmael, the court notably recognized the tension
between the right to privacy and the increasing technological sophistica-
tion used in the "war on drugs."'2 6 The court argued:
The question before the [c]ourt concerns the limitation, if any, on the
[g]overnment's ability to use thermal imaging devices to detect con-
21. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 464 n.6 (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 789-90 (1971) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
23. In Florida v. Riley, the dissent argued that:
The result of [this] inquiry in any given case depends ultimately on the judgment "whether,
if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated
by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would
be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society."
Id. at 456 (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 403 (1974)).
24. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
25. See United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992).
26. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 207-08 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (granting a
motion to suppress evidence resulting from the execution of a search warrant based on
thermal imagery evidence).
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cealed underground illegal activity. The issue was spawned by the
tension created between the right to privacy on the one hand and our
society's rapidly evolving technological sophistication on the other.
Left unchecked, technology has the potential to restrict, as a practi-
cal matter, the right to privacy .... We must take care that the war
on drugs not count as one of its victims fundamental rights. The ben-
efits to our society of safeguarding the right to privacy is such that
the courts must say that there is a limit to the use of technological
weapons, even in the war on drugs. 27
The district court in Ishmael further recognized that "[i]f the government
has the right to . . . make frequent flyovers using FLIR and other ad-
vanced technology, all without a warrant, there is precious little left of the
right to privacy."'28
This comment will argue that the use of advanced technologies in the
"war on drugs" should not erode a person's fundamental right to privacy.
To prevent this erosion of the right to privacy, courts should reexamine
the right and should extend Fourth Amendment protection against war-
rantless search and seizure of garbage by the police and against warrant-
less police surveillance with thermal imagers.
First, we must examine the history of search and seizure generally.
Next, we will discuss search and seizure in the specific contexts of war-
rantless trash seizures and warrantless surveillance with a thermal imager.
Finally, in light of this discussion, we will address concerns over the future
of the right to privacy in the face of evolving technological innovations
used in the realm of search and seizure.
Exactly how far are we willing to allow warrantless search and seizure
to extend? We begin with an overview of the history of search and
seizure.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND FOURTH AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.29
The Fourth Amendment limits the government's investigatory activities
by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. It applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 In or-
der to comply with the Fourth Amendment, federal agents, police, and
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 213.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that there is no difference
between how the Fourth Amendment applies to a state action as opposed to a federal
action); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
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other law enforcement officials must demonstrate probable cause and
must obtain a warrant prior to search. 31
Since the purpose of the search warrant is to search for and seize
evidence, instrumentalities, fruits of a crime, or contraband, the war-
rant must specifically designate the items to be seized, and [the]
whereabouts of the material. For search warrants, the particularity
requirement safeguards the individual's privacy interest against a
general exploratory rummaging .... The proposed search warrant is
normally accompanied by an affidavit. The affidavit must establish
probable cause to believe that the property sought is related to the
crime being investigated, and that the property is at the place to be
searched. 32
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1) states:
A warrant ... shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to
before the federal magistrate judge or state judge and establishing
the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the federal magistrate judge
or state judge is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or
that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, that magistrate
judge or state judge shall issue a warrant identifying the property or
person to be seized and naming or describing the person or place to
be searched. The finding of probable cause may be based upon hear-
say evidence in whole or in part.... The warrant shall be directed to
a civil officer of the United States authorized to enforce or assist in
enforcing any law thereof or to a person so authorized by the Presi-
dent of the United States. It shall command the officer to search,
within a specified period of time not to exceed [ten] days, the person
or place named for the property or person specified. The warrant
shall be served in the daytime, 33 unless the issuing authority, by ap-
propriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown,
authorizes its execution at times other than daytime. It shall desig-
nate a federal magistrate judge to whom it shall be returned.34
After the search, the officer must give an inventory of the property
seized to the federal magistrate judge.35 A defendant can make a motion
for return of property36 or a motion to suppress 37 if the search and
seizure is unlawful. In this manner, the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement functions as a safeguard of a person's privacy rights by de-
terring potentially unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officials.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that all searches and seizures
conducted by government agents that intrude upon an interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment are per se unreasonable if they are conducted
31. See SUrIN, supra note 9, at 62, 69.
32. Id. at 69 (citation omitted).
33. "The term 'daytime' is used in this rule to mean the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00
p.m. according to local time." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h).
34. Id. 41(c)(1).
35. See id. 41(d).
36. See id. 41(e).
37. See id. 41(f). The motion to suppress is made later in the trial court. See id.
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without a warrant.38 There are only a few well-defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement in searches and seizures. These exceptions include:
(1) searches incident to arrest;39 (2) when there are "exigent circum-
stances; 40 (3) when the evidence is in "plain view;"''a (4) when consent is
given;4 2 (5) stop and frisk searches;4 3 and (6) regulatory searches. 44
Probably the most important aspect of the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary
rule requires a court to exclude all evidence obtained by the government
as a result of a search or seizure that is found to violate the Fourth
Amendment.45 The main purpose of this rule is to deter unconstitutional
conduct by government agents.4 6
The Supreme Court has established a limited good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.47 Under this good faith exception, the exclusionary
rule no longer applies to those situations where evidence is obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a de-
tached and neutral magistrate when that warrant is later held to have not
been supported by probable cause. 48 Other exceptions to the exclusion-
ary rule include: (1) when the illegally obtained evidence would have
38. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
39. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that when a lawful arrest is
made, the arresting officer does not need a warrant to search the arrestee's person and the
area within his immediate control).
40. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that a warrant is not needed if
the search is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence).
41. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (holding that when the police are
legally on a person's premises, and they see obviously incriminating evidence that is imme-
diately apparent, they can seize the evidence without a warrant).
42. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a person's lack
of knowledge that he has a right to refuse to consent to the search is but one factor in
determining the validity of that consent). Consent searches are exempted from the general
requirements of probable cause and warrant. See id. at 219, 245-46; see also Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). Constitutional demands are met if permission
to search is given voluntarily by a party with the requisite authority. See Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 248-49 (holding that voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all
the circumstances). Defense attorneys often challenge the voluntariness of the consent to
the search, and the prosecution has the burden of showing the voluntary nature of the
consent. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968); see also United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (ruling that a party giving consent must possess au-
thority over the premises or a sufficient relationship to the premises or effects to be in-
spected, but need not be the party against whom the investigation is conducted).
43. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that when police officers observe
unusual conduct that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that criminal conduct is
afoot and the suspect may be armed and dangerous, no warrant is needed for them to
conduct a brief stop and "pat down" search to discover weapons).
44. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that a brief
stop of vehicle motorists to check for intoxication does not require a warrant, probable
cause, or even individualized suspicion, as long as every motorist is stopped).
45. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655; Fremont Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The exclusionary rule applies in both federal and state courts. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
46. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). The exclusionary rule deters
police and other law enforcement misconduct in two ways: (1) exclusion discourages indi-
vidual violations of the Fourth Amendment by eliminating incentives to disregard it; and
(2) exclusion furthers systematic deterrence. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
47. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
48. Id. at 907.
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been inevitably discovered through lawful activity; 49 (2) when there is a
standing exception, and the illegally obtained evidence is admitted
against a defendant who is not the victim of the Fourth Amendment vio-
lation;50 and (3) when the illegally obtained evidence is admitted to im-
peach the testimony of the defendant.51
A crucial part of the exclusionary rule is the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. Under this doctrine, evidence that is directly seized as part of
an unconstitutional search (the "primary" or "tainted" evidence) is not
the only evidence that is suppressed at trial.52 Any evidence that is ob-
tained as a result of that "primary" or "tainted" evidence is excluded as
well.53 Such later-acquired evidence is called "secondary" or "derivative"
evidence and is referred to as the fruits of the poisonous tree.54 So, if
government agents obtain "primary" or "tainted" evidence as a result of
an unconstitutional search, and because of this "tainted evidence" obtain
a search warrant, any evidence acquired pursuant to that warrant should
be suppressed at trial.55
There are two exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
First, according to the independent source doctrine, evidence acquired
through means wholly independent of police misconduct is admissible to
prove a criminal violation. 56 Second, the attenuation exception allows
evidence of the search to be admitted if the link between the police mis-
conduct and the acquisition of the evidence has become attenuated,
thereby dissipating the taint. 57
However, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine appears less fre-
quently than it once did in the 1960s.58 One possible explanation for this
49. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
50. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
51. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
52. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3(a), at
471 (2d ed. 1992).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.; see also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939) (holding that
the government is not only forbidden from using information obtained from an illegal
wiretap at trial, but also cannot use any evidence that it later acquired as a result of that
illegal wiretap information).
56. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 473 (1980); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
57. See Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. The focus of the attenuation analysis is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963).
58. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding that where police officers
illegally enter and secure a dwelling to preserve potential evidence, but later conduct a
search under a warrant supported by an "independent source" for probable cause, evi-
dence obtained from that warranted search is not fruit of the poisonous tree and not sub-
ject to the exclusionary rule); Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44 (1984) (holding that evidence subject
to the exclusionary rule should not be excluded if the court determines that the police
officers would "inevitably" have discovered the same evidence by using other police tech-
niques if they had not first discovered it illegally); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(holding that evidence held inadmissible under the exclusionary rule may nonetheless be
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decline is because the doctrine presents particular problems in the realm
of search and seizure. 59
The Fourth Amendment provides a powerful shield to criminal defend-
ants. It allows criminal defendants to exclude otherwise admissible and
highly probative evidence at their trial. If such evidence is suppressed,
the government is often forced to drop charges, even though it is highly
likely that the defendant is guilty. This is an important reason why crimi-
nal defendants often assert that the police violated their Fourth Amend-
ment rights in order to avoid having incriminating evidence presented at
their trial.
In order to make out a prima facie case for a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion and a case invoking the exclusionary rule, a criminal defendant must
establish three elements. The defendant must first prove that the pur-
ported search or seizure was conducted by a government agent-the state
action requirement. 60 The defendant must next prove that the search or
seizure intruded upon an interest of the defendant that is protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 61 Then, the defendant must establish the third
element, that the government conduct involved a "search" or "seizure. '62
Because warrantless trash seizures and warrantless infrared surveil-
lance must involve a government agent, we will examine in-depth the first
element that a criminal defendant must prove, the state action require-
ment.63 The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as only restraining searches or seizures conducted by gov-
ernment actors, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not restrain
purely private actions.64
However, the mere fact that the actual search is conducted by a private
party is not dispositive of' the agency issue. The Supreme Court has held
that the relationship between a private party conducting a search and the
used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (holding that
connection between the illegal search and the evidence sought to be admitted can be so
"attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the original illegality).
59. Often because the actual seizure is not illegal, the connection between the police
conduct and the acquisition is less apparent. The intervention of time and other circum-
stances make it especially difficult to prove causation. See Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. Also,
despite the fact that there is police misconduct, lawful investigatory measures may have
contributed equally to the securing of the evidence. See Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S.
at 392. There is concern that a rigid application of the exclusionary rule would provide a
perpetual shield to criminal defendants against prosecution because their illegal activities
were first discovered through police misconduct. It was not intended for criminals to bene-
fit from the exclusionary rule in this manner. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443.
60. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (noting that Fourth Amend-
ment protection proscribes only governmental action).
61. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 27 (defining a "protected interest").
62. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that if a canine sniffs a
person's luggage, then it is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes).
63. The agency issue presents particular problems in the realm of warrantless trash
seizures when trash collectors or other private individuals become involved in the seizure.
64. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that the Fourth Amendment is implicated whenever the search or seizure is con-
ducted by a "sovereign authority," not just the police or other law enforcement agents. See
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985).
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government can be so close as to make the private party an agent of the
government. 65 The landmark Supreme Court decision dealing with the
question of whether a private party was acting as an agent of the govern-
ment is Coolidge v. New Hampshire.66 In Coolidge, the defendant stood
accused of the kidnapping and murder of a teenage girl.67 In the normal
course of their investigation, two police officers assigned to the case rou-
tinely asked their prime suspects if they owned any guns.68 If the suspects
owned any guns, the two officers would then ask for the guns to run bal-
listics tests in order to rule out each person as a suspect. 69 The officers
met with the defendant's wife and, when asked if the defendant owned
any guns, she produced the gun that the defendant had used to murder
the teenage girl.70 The wife then asked the officers if they needed the
gun, and the officers eventually took it.71
In Coolidge, the defendant moved for the gun, the murder weapon, to
be suppressed as evidence at trial because his wife was acting as an agent
of the police when she gave the two investigating officers the gun. Thus,
the defendant argued that the police taking the gun was a warrantless
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.72
The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's argument in Coo-
lidge. The Supreme Court held that the test for determining whether a
person is acting as an agent of the government is "whether [the private
party], in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as
having acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state when [the search or
seizure occurred]. '73
The Supreme Court set forth two ways that this test could be met.
First, the defendant could show that the police intended to seize the prop-
erty beforehand and ought to have obtained a warrant.74 Second, the
defendant could show that the police attempted to "coerce, dominate, or
direct" the actions of the private party.75 In Coolidge, the Supreme Court
addressed the first instance and found no evidence that the police officers
intended to retrieve the murder weapon from the defendant or the defen-
dant's wife beforehand or to rummage among the defendant's personal
effects and dispossess him of any property. 76 In the second instance, the
Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the officers acted in
any way to coerce, dominate, or direct the defendant's wife. 77 Instead,
65. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
66. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
67. See id. at 445, 447.
68. See id. at 485.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 486.
71. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 486.
72. See id. at 487.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 488.
75. See id. at 488-89.
76. See id. at 485, 488.
77. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 489-90.
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the Supreme Court found that the defendant's wife acted on her own
initiative when she offered to retrieve her husband's gun to help the po-
lice. 78 The defendant's wife believed there was nothing to hide from the
police.79
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision, there has been much con-
fusion in the lower federal courts on how to apply the Coolidge test. A
recent Ninth Circuit case helps illustrate how the lower federal courts
have since applied the Coolidge test to various fact patterns. In United
States v. Reed,80 the manager of a private hotel suspected that one of his
guests was using his room for illicit drug activities. 81 The manager called
the local police under the guise that he needed officers to provide protec-
tion while he checked the room.82 Two officers arrived at the hotel and
accompanied the hotel manager into the guest's room. While in the
room, they observed some drug instruments in plain view.8 3 The officers
then determined that the manager was safe and remained in the doorway
to the guest's room.84 Meanwhile, the manager of the hotel proceeded to
rifle through a dresser drawer and opened the guest's briefcase.85 Based
on information obtained through that search, the police officers obtained
a search warrant, found a pistol and drugs, and arrested the guest.
8 6
The defendant (the guest) made a motion to suppress the evidence
found pursuant to the search warrant. The defendant argued that the
manager of the hotel was acting as a government agent and that the initial
search leading to the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.87 The
Ninth Circuit recognized the somewhat muddled gray area between the
extremes of overt governmental participation in a search, clearly impli-
cating the Fourth Amendment, and the complete absence of such partici-
pation, not implicating the Fourth Amendment.88 The Ninth Circuit held
that the search in Reed fell into the gray area that appears when private
individuals become involved in searches and seizures, yet it still impli-
cated the Fourth Amendment.8 9 For cases that fall into the gray area, the
Ninth Circuit set up a two-part test for determining whether a private
individual is acting as a government agent for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.90 First, the court should determine "whether the govern-
ment knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct." 91 Second, if this
first prong is met, the court should determine "whether the party per-
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994).





86. See Reed, 15 F.3d at 930.
87. See id. at 930-31.






forming the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or [to] fur-
ther his own ends." 92
The Ninth Circuit held in Reed that the two police officers knew of and
acquiesced in the manager's search of the defendant's hotel room.93 The
court also ruled that the manager did not have any independent motiva-
tion for rummaging through the defendant's personal belongings.94 The
court held that the hotel manager was not protecting motel property but,
instead, was solely helping the police take action.95 According to the
court, this is clearly not a motivation independent of the government. 96
The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the government's contentions that a
desire by a private party to prevent criminal activity constitutes an inde-
pendent motivation because that would mean the second element of the
test would rarely be satisfied since most private parties assist the police to
prevent criminal activity.97 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the police officers' presence in the doorway was
"merely incidental." 98 The Ninth Circuit found that the officers' presence
at the motel was more than incidental and was sufficient to create an
agency relationship. 99 The officers were aware the search was being con-
ducted and were aware the search would have violated the Fourth
Amendment had they performed it.100
Thus, federal courts have been increasingly willing to find the requisite
contacts between a private party conducting a search and the government
in order to apply the protections of the Fourth Amendment. However, at
the same time, federal courts have been careful to distinguish those cases
where the government is actively involved in the search or seizure, like in
the Reed case, from those where the contact is merely incidental or de
minimus.
An example of the latter types of cases, where the federal courts find
no agency relationship, is United States v. Kinney.10 1 In Kinney, the de-
fendant's girlfriend voluntarily called the police after she discovered
guns, which she believed to be stolen, in the defendant's locked closet. 102
Upon the girlfriend's request, the police entered the defendant's apart-
ment.10 3 After the police refused to look inside the locked closet, the
92. Reed, 15 F.3d at 931.
93. The Ninth Circuit relied on three facts in making its decision: (1) the officers "were
personally present during the search"; (2) the officers "knew exactly what [the manager]
was doing as he was doing it"; and (3) the officers "made no attempt to discourage [the
manager] from examining [the defendant's] personal belongings beyond what was required
to protect hotel property." Id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 931-32.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Reed, 15 F.3d at 931-32.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. 953 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1992).
102. See id. at 864.
103. See id.
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girlfriend opened it up and handed the guns to the officers, who did not
have a warrant.'0 4
At trial, the defendant in Kinney made a motion to suppress the evi-
dence on the grounds that his girlfriend had been acting as a government
agent and that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. 10 5
The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument and allowed the
evidence in at trial, reasoning that "more than the mere presence of a
police officer [at the time of the search] is necessary to constitute the
government action required to implicate Fourth Amendment con-
cerns."'1 06 The Fourth Circuit found that where private parties act on
their own initiative to make a search, without any suggestion by police
officers, there is no agency under the Coolidge test.107
Apparently, the Coolidge test did not establish a bright-line rule that
lends itself to easy application by the lower federal courts. Some lower
federal courts adopted the Ninth Circuit's rigid two-part test from Reed,
while others have required a certain level of government involvement or
a certain amount of evidence indicating a lack of an independent motive
by the private party. For example, the Sixth Circuit expressed its opinion
that the proper analysis under Coolidge is whether the police "instigated,
encouraged or participated in the search," a test that ignores motive.10 8
This is in direct conflict with the courts that have given almost controlling
weight to the motivation of the private party. 10 9 Although each court
places its individual spin on both parts of the Ninth Circuit's test, some
form of that test remains as the majority view in the federal system.1 0
The agency issue may present multifarious problems, particularly in the
realm of warrantless trash seizures. This is especially true when the po-
lice involve trash collectors or other private individuals in the search and
seizure of the garbage."' This comment will now examine search and
seizure in the specific context of trash seizure cases.
III. ORIGINS OF THE TRASH SEIZURE CASES:
ABANDONMENT OR PRIVACY?
There are two approaches in trash seizure cases: abandonment and pri-
vacy. The early Supreme Court adopted a property-based approach to
104. See id. at 864-65.
105. See id. at 865.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985).
109. See Gundlach v. Janing, 401 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. Neb. 1975), affd per curiam,
536 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that "the intent of the private person in conducting a
search ... is a proper factor for consideration.").
110. But see Anthony G. Scheer, Note, A Search by Any Other Name: Fourth Amend-
ment Implications of a Private Citizen's Actions in State v. Sanders, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1449,
1456 (1991) (arguing that the courts should adopt a but for test).
111. See, e.g., State v. Hauser, 464 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. 1995).
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the search and seizure of trash.112 The Court used an abandonment anal-
ysis in its first trash seizure cases and reasoned through the basic law of
property that when an object is abandoned, the defendant relinquishes
[all] property rights as to subsequent finders.1 13 In line with this analysis,
if the police seize abandoned property, they DO not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Under the logic of the abandonment approach, if the origi-
nal owner relinquishes all property rights, then there are no Fourth
Amendment consequences.
This abandonment analysis consisted of two inquiries: (1) whether the
defendant intended to abandon the object recovered by the police; and
(2) whether the police intrusion took place in an area protected by the
Fourth Amendment.' 4
Addressing the first prong, property law recognizes that the act of
abandonment is demonstrated by an intention to relinquish all title, pos-
session, or claim to property, accompanied by some type of act or omis-
sion by which such intention is manifested. 115 Intent is a question of fact
and is not presumed, and proof supporting it must be direct or affirmative
or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the throwing away. 116
Regarding the second inquiry, a violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurs when the police physically intrude into a "constitutionally pro-
tected area."' 1 7 Areas protected include persons, houses, and papers and
effects. 118 The Fourth Amendment also protects clothing, apartments,
hotel rooms, garages, business offices, stores, warehouses, letters, and
automobiles. 119
Under the abandonment approach, the concept of curtilage helped de-
termine what and where constitutionally protected areas were.' 20 Curti-
lage, the area immediately surrounding the home, was protected by the
Fourth Amendment under the abandonment approach.' 2' The courts as-
112. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960).
113. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59.
114. See Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (applying both prongs of
the abandonment analysis).
115. See generally Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search
and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1970-
71). Mascolo contends that:
The significance of abandoned property in the law of search and seizure lies in the maxim
that the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to it. Thus, where one
abandons property, he is said to bring his right to privacy therein to an end, and may not
later complain about its subsequent seizure and use in evidence against him. In short, the
theory of abandonment is that no issue of search is presented in such a situation, and the
property so abandoned may be seized without probable cause.
Id.
116. See id. at 402; see also United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1968)
(quoting Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R., 127 N.E. 237, 238 (N.Y. 1920)).
117. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(c), at 302-03 (2d ed. 1987).
118. See id. at 303.
119. See id.
120. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928).
121. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 n.3; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 440.
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sessed the dimensions of the curtilage on a case-by-case basis.1 22
In 1967, in the watershed case Katz v. United States,123 the Supreme
Court rejected abandonment and adopted an approach based on an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy. The focus shifted to protecting the pri-
vacy of the citizen from unreasonable government investigation. The
Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.124
The Court stated: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
1 25
Under Katz, a person must meet two requirements: (1) the person must
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) the
expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize
as objectively reasonable.126 The Supreme Court continues to follow the
test formulated in Katz and it continues to be the prevailing test regard-
ing trash seizure cases today.127
The Supreme Court retreated from Katz's twenty one years later in
California v. Greenwood privacy approach. 128 In a confusing and often
122. See Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966) (holding that
curtilage is determined by the facts of the case); see also United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d
632 (3d Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court has articulated four additional factors in determin-
ing curtilage: (1) proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is included within
an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses of the area; and (4) the steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. See
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300-03.
123. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the government agents suspected the defendant of
conducting an illegal gambling operation from a public telephone booth. See id. The
agents placed a recording device outside the booth and monitored the defendant's tele-
phone conversations. See id. at 348. Despite the defendant's motion to suppress, the evi-
dence was ruled admissible at trial and the defendant was found guilty. See id. On appeal,
the Supreme Court afforded Fourth Amendment protection to the defendant's phone calls.
See id. at 359.
124. See id. at 353 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court recognized that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas' ... it becomes clear that the reach of
[the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure." Id. The Court forcefully rejected its property-based abandon-
ment analysis. See id.
125. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
126. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under Katz, "a man's home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy .... Id.
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). However,
some commentators argue that the abandonment approach is still alive and well. They
argue that the property-based abandonment approach is viable and remains the dominant
approach. See United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972) (suggesting a link
between the property and privacy approaches). But see People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713
(Cal. 1969); People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per
curiam), affd, 504 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
128. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35. In Greenwood, the police suspected the defendant
of narcotics trafficking . The police asked a trash collector to pick up the trash bags that
the defendant had left on the curb in front of his house. The trash collector turned the
garbage bags over to the police. The police rummaged through the defendant's trash bags
without a warrant. This inspection of the trash revealed evidence of narcotics use and a
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contradictory opinion, the Court held that "privacy expectations [with re-
spect to trash in seizure cases] were objectively unreasonable."'1 29 Previ-
ous court decisions were in accordance with this view.130
In a vehement dissent to the Court's decision in Greenwood, Justice
Brennan argued that trash bags were private containers.' 3 ' Justice Bren-
nan stated:
A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and
recreational habits of the person who produced it. A search of trash,
like the search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sex-
ual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk
drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can
divulge the target's financial and professional status, political affilia-
tions and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and
romantic interests. It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag
harbors telling evidence of the "intimate activity associated with the
'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"' which the
Fourth Amendment is designed to protect. 132
For support of his dissenting argument, Brennan relied upon local ordi-
nances prohibiting others from rummaging through garbage.133 Brennan
contended through this analogy that these ordinances reinforced an indi-
vidual's privacy expectations in their garbage. 134
Furthermore, Justice Brennan attacked the majority's argument that
police officers and other law enforcement officials should be able to claw
through a person's trash without a warrant because any scavenger off the
street can do so. Justice Brennan countered:
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rum-
mage through the containers does not negate the expectation of pri-
vacy in their contents any more than the possibility of a burglary
negates an expectation of privacy in the home; or the possibility of a
private intrusion negates an expectation of privacy in an unopened
package; or the possibility that an operator will listen in on a tele-
phone conversation negates an expectation of privacy in the words
warrant to search the defendant's home was issued based on the evidence obtained
through the trash seizure. See id. at 37-38.
129. Id. at 41-42.
130. "Understandable as this desire for [privacy in trash] may be, it is not conclusive of
society's willingness to recognize an expectation of privacy in ... garbage ... as reasonable.
... [I]t would be reasonable to expect trash to be accidentally removed .. .by running
children, passing cars, stray dogs, or even a visitor .. " Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798
(Alaska 1973). The Alaska Supreme Court's weak analogy between scavengers and law
enforcement officials bolsters the argument that the police ought to be able to perform
searches without a warrant simply because scavengers can. The Supreme Court later
adopted this view in support of its decision that a privacy expectation in garbage is objec-
tively unreasonable. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54 (citing People v. Krivda, 504 P.2d 457
(1973)).
131. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 50-51.
133. See id. at 52. Justice Brennan argued that the Court had protected privacy expec-
tations in containers similar to trash bags and that the fact that the garbage bags were
being used to dispose, not transport, items should not make a difference. See id. at 49, 52.
134. See id. at 51.
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spoken on the telephone. "What a person ... seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected." We have therefore repeatedly rejected attempts to
justify a State's invasion of privacy on the ground that the privacy is
not absolute. As Justice Scalia [has stated], the Fourth Amendment
protects "privacy ... not solitude." 135
It should come as no surprise that the legacy of Greenwood is rather
confusing. The Greenwood Court suggested at least three approaches to
analyzing trash seizure cases, yet failed to adopt any one of the three as
controlling. Coming away from the hodgepodge of Greenwood, it is
clear: (1) that the Court relied upon Katz to conclude that privacy expec-
tations in trash are unreasonable; (2) that the Court also relied on Katz to
assert that when persons knowingly expose their garbage, their privacy
expectations are necessarily defeated (the knowing exposure test); and
(3) that the Court relied upon the abandonment approach to endorse a
more bright-lined test under which no privacy expectations can attach to
garbage left outside the curtilage.136
The Court's decision seems to suggest that the property-based aban-
donment test is still viable. However, just a year before its decision in
Greenwood, Justice White, in a forceful dissenting opinion, explicitly re-
jected this property-based analysis in the context of trash seizure cases. 137
This is yet another example of the inconsistencies in the Court's decision
in Greenwood.
Post-Greenwood, lower courts have had a difficult time interpreting
which rule to apply in the context of trash seizure cases. Notably, the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Hedrick,138 formulated its own adapta-
tion of the knowing-exposure test outlined by the Supreme Court in
Greenwood. The Seventh Circuit held that the main determination was
whether the garbage was in a publicly accessible place where it was likely
to be viewed by the public. 139 If so, then the garbage is knowingly ex-
135. Id. at 54 (citations omitted); see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-
17 (1961); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987).
136. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35.
137. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (per curiam) (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice White, who wrote the opinion in Katz, stated:
I assume that under state law [defendant] retained an ownership or possessory interest in
the trash bag and its contents. [This] property interest, however, does not settle the matter
for Fourth Amendment purposes, . . . As we have said, the premise that property interests
control the right of officials to search and seize has been discredited.
Id.
138. 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1991).
139. See id. at 400. But the Seventh Circuit relied on the all too familiar scavenger
analogy. See id. The court argued:
The willingness of members of the public to trespass upon private property in order to
search through garbage cans cannot automatically defeat the Fourth Amendment expecta-
tion of privacy any more than a series of burglaries could eliminate any expectation of
privacy in the home. Where, however, the garbage is readily accessible from the street or
other public thoroughfares, an expectation of privacy may be objectively unreasonable be-
cause of the common practice of scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public in
sorting through garbage. In other words, garbage placed where it is not only accessible to
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posed to the public for Fourth Amendment purposes. Any expectation of
privacy is, therefore, deemed objectively unreasonable per Katz. 14 It is
interesting to note here that the knowing-exposure test focuses mainly on
place, not privacy. The concept of curtilage is still coming into play, al-
though the Seventh Circuit follows the Supreme Court and argues that it
is not controlling. 141
Finally, United States v. Scott142 opened up yet another dimension in
trash seizure cases. In Scott, a bookkeeper began to file IRS returns elec-
tronically from his personal computer in 1989. The IRS later learned of a
possible scheme to defraud the government by filing false tax returns. In
June 1989, the IRS investigation focused on the bookkeeper, Scott.
Every week, the IRS conducted searches of Scott's garbage. An IRS
agent would actually pose as a trash collector and pick up Scott's garbage
from the curb in front of Scott's house. However, much of the trash had
been shredded, so the IRS agents had to reconstruct those documents
from the trash. These reconstructed documents were used to obtain a
search warrant for Scott's home. In that search, the IRS seized numerous
papers and effects. The seized documents, along with those reconstructed
from Scott's trash, constituted virtually all of the evidence against Scott
that connected him to the tax fraud scheme. 143
At trial, Scott moved to suppress all documents seized in both the war-
rantless search of his trash and the search of his home, as the fruits of
those searches, arguing that the IRS had violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. The district court granted that motion, holding that the search was
unconstitutional because it violated Scott's reasonable expectations of
privacy.144 The district court argued:
[D]efendant had taken steps to protect his privacy rights by shred-
ding his trash. In Greenwood the [c]ourt stated that it was "common
knowledge" that trash left on the curb is accessible to snoops and
scavengers. But, it is not "common knowledge" that snoops and
scavengers may retrieve shredded materials and then "painstakingly
reconstruct" them to learn the contents. Society would accept as rea-
sonable, therefore, defendant's belief that, once he shredded his
documents, they would be shielded from public examination. 145
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, holding that even the warrantless
seizure of shredded trash does not violate the Fourth Amendment.146
The confusion of lower courts in how to review trash search and seizure




141. See id. at 398.
142. 776 F. Supp. 629, 630 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1042 (1993).
143. See id. at 630.
144. See id. at 633-33.
145. Id. at 632 (citations omitted).
146. See United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992).
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cases after Greenwood becomes evident through the decision in United
States v. Scott. There is tension between those courts that continue to see
vitality in Katz's exclusive consideration of the defendant's privacy expec-
tations and those courts relying upon the knowing-exposure tests and re-
maining abandonment analysis from Greenwood.
Next, this comment will discuss search and seizure in the particular
context of helicopter surveillance.
IV. SOMEBODY'S EYES ARE WATCHING: WARRANTLESS
INFRARED SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
This section will begin with a discussion of United States v. Penny-Fee-
ney, 14 7 which was one of the earliest and most influential cases holding
that warrantless thermal scanning does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.148 A substantial number of courts are in accordance with Penny-
Feeney.14 9 Penny-Feeney involved two defendants who were suspected of
federal drug and firearm violations.' 50 The investigation leading to the
defendants' indictment began in 1988, when the police received a tip that
one defendant, Penny, had previously sold drugs in California and contin-
ued to sell drugs in Hawaii.151 In 1989, the police obtained a search war-
rant to open a package mailed to Penny.152 The package contained
$2,700 in cash and a trained dog detected traces of narcotics on the
money. 153 Another anonymous informant contacted the police depart-
ment approximately eight months later, stating that Penny was operating
a large-scale marijuana-growing operation in his home.154 A separate in-
formant corroborated this information and provided the police with a lay-
out of the growing area in the garage. 155 The informant also stated that
Penny had just married Feeney and that the newlywed couple made their
living from the profits from the marijuana-growing operation. 156
An officer then drove by the defendants' home and further corrobo-
147. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
148. See id. at 228.
149. See United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995-97 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp.
1460, 1472-75 (E.D. Wash. 1994), affd, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Porco,
842 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-98 (D. Wyo. 1994), affid sub nom., United States v. Cusumano, 67
F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 791-92 (D. Or. 1992),
affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994); State v.
Cramer, 851 P.2d 147, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 808-10
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993). Ford and Pinson are the only cases in which federal courts of review
have decided the issue, following the reasoning of Penny-Feeney. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 995-
97; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59.
150. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 221.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 222.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 222 n.3.
156. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223.
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rated that the informant's descriptions were accurate. 157 To obtain fur-
ther confirmation, the officer also arranged to fly over the house in a
helicopter with a FLIR. 158 The FLIR enabled the police officer to see
what he could not have seen with his naked eye alone. The FLIR regis-
tered a strong artificial heat source from the walls of the garage, which is
consistent with the use of grow lamps for marijuana production. 159 Based
on the results of the package mailed to Penny, the informant's testimony,
the officer's visual observations, and the FLIR reading, the judge issued a
warrant to search the house.160 The police searched the house and found
extensive evidence of a marijuana-growing operation. 161
The defendants made a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursu-
ant to the warrant to search their house and pursuant to the warrant to
search Penny's package.1 62 The defendants contended that the judge had
based the warrants on illegally obtained information, more specifically,
that the warrantless scan with an infrared device was a search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.' 63
The district court rejected this argument by the defendants and held
that the use of an infrared device in airspace above the defendants' resi-
dence was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.1 64 The district court applied the Supreme Court's privacy test from
Katz.' 65
The Katz test requires: (1) that the person involved exhibit an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (2) that
expectation of privacy must be one society will recognize as reasona-
ble. 166 In applying the Katz test, the Penny-Feeney court, in a particularly
weak analogy, characterized the FLIR's target as "waste heat," reasoning
that the infrared device only detected heat that emanated from the
house.' 67 Also, the court held that the defendants made no attempt to
contain the heat, but, instead, voluntarily vented it.168 Accordingly,
under the first prong of the Katz test, the court in Penny-Feeney deter-
mined that the defendants had no actual expectation of privacy in this
"waste heat" because they voluntarily exposed the heat to the public and
did not try to prevent it from escaping.' 69 Under the second prong of the
157. See id.
158. See id. at 223 n.5.
159. See id. at 224.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 224-25.
163. See id. at 225.
164. See id. at 228. The Penny-Feeney court also held that there was probable cause to
support the warrant independent of the FLIR evidence. See id. at 229.
165. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
166. See id. at 361.
167. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 225.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 226 (stating that defendants "voluntarily vented [heat] outside the garage
where it could be exposed to the public and in no way attempted to impede its escape or
exercise dominion over it").
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Katz test, the Penny-Feeney court concluded that, even if the defendants
had manifested an actual expectation of privacy in the heat, society would
not recognize that expectation of privacy as reasonable. 170
This "waste heat" that the FLIR detected was analogized to the war-
rantless search and seizure of garbage left on the curb outside of a resi-
dence. 171 Much like in Greenwood,172 the Penny-Feeney court deemed
controlling the scavenger analogy because the general public had knowl-
edge that anyone had access to garbage set outside for collection. 173 So-
ciety would not accept a privacy interest in such garbage as reasonable. 174
The court in Penny-Feeney further reasoned that the use of the FLIR
did not embarrass the defendants or involve a bodily search, and the heat
physically indicated a possible crime.1 75 The court further noted that the
Supreme Court had upheld the observation of the area near a home from
an airplane or a helicopter flying in public airspace. 176 The Supreme
Court relied upon the fact that these observations involved no physical
intrusion. 77 The Penny-Feeney court characterized the FLIR as a "pas-
sive, non-intrusive instrument" that sends no "beams or rays into the area
on which it is fixed.' 78 The court reasoned that an infrared device does
not in any way penetrate the area.'79 The court in Penny-Feeney deter-
mined that an overflight using a FLIR resembled the flights that the Su-
preme Court found permissible.' 80
Another important case holding that a warrantless infrared scan of a
defendant's home did not violate the Fourth Amendment is United States
v. Pinson.181 In Pinson, the police suspected that the defendant grew ma-
rijuana after they received notice that suppliers of hydroponics equip-
ment had mailed packages to the defendant. 82 Based on the packages
and evidence of the defendant's unusually high electrical usage, the police
decided to perform aerial thermal surveillance of the defendant's home
with a FLIR.183 The FLIR scan detected excessive amounts of heat ema-
nating from a covered window, the roof, and a skylight. 184 Based on the
packages and the FLIR scan, the police obtained a search warrant and
170. See id. at 226-28.
171. See id. at 226.
172. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
173. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 220, 226.
174. See id. at 227.
175. See id.
176. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
177. See Riley, 448 U.S. at 449; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-14.
178. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 227-28 (comparing overflight in the case to the flights in Ciraolo and
Riley and placing great emphasis on the fact that the infrared beams from the FLIR did not
physically invade the defendants' home).
181. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that because defendant's subjective expecta-
tion of privacy is not one that society finds objectively reasonable, the warrantless search
did not violate the Fourth Amendment).





arrested the defendant for the growing and processing of marijuana. At
trial, the defendant was found guilty. 185 On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the warrantless FLIR scan violated the Fourth
Amendment. 186
The Pinson court followed Penny-Feeney and concluded that because
the FLIR detected only surface heat and did not invade the defendant's
residence, it did not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 187 The Pinson court also held that society would not recog-
nize the defendant's expectation of privacy in the surface heat as reasona-
ble under the Katz privacy test.188
However, a Texas district court has also addressed the issue of whether
the warrantless scan of the defendants' buildings with a thermal imaging
device is a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In United States
v. Ishmael,189 the court held that the warrantless infrared search did, in-
deed, violate the Fourth Amendment. 90
The defendants in Ishmael purchased a large amount of concrete and
begun a construction project on a secluded area of property.19t After the
police became aware that the defendants had built a basement under the
mobile home on the property, the police engaged in aerial surveillance
with a FLIR device. 192 The police found a metal building and a nearby
brush pile that were considerably hotter than their surroundings. 93 The
police obtained a search warrant based on the scan and arrested the de-
fendants after they found marijuana on the premises. 194 The defendants
then claimed that the warrantless FLIR scan violated the Fourth
Amendment.1 95
The court then applied the Katz test and held that the warrantless in-
frared search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court first held that
the defendants had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
heat vented from their building.196 The court next found that society rec-
ognized the defendants' expectation of privacy in the heat as
reasonable. 97
Also, in State v. Young,198 the Supreme Court of Washington consid-
ered whether a warrantless infrared surveillance of the defendant's home
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59 (concluding that use of the FLIR is not a search).
188. See id.
189. 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
190. See id. at 205.
191. See id. at 208.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 209.
195. See Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 209.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 212 (distinguishing the case on the basis that the search did not involve
naked eye observations, but observations that the government had to use high-technology
devices to detect the heat).
198. See 867 P.2d 593, 594 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
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constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The police
received an anonymous note, which stated that the defendant operated a
large marijuana-growing operation. 199 After observing the defendant's
home and determining that the defendant's power consumption records
were abnormally high, the police scanned the defendant's house with a
thermal device. 200 The thermal scanner revealed that the basement and
other portions of the defendant's house were excessively hot.201 The po-
lice obtained a search warrant, and their search revealed a marijuana-
growing operation.202 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence ob-
tained in the illegal search.20 3
The court in Young held that the warrantless thermal scan search was
an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 20 4 The
court rejected the Penny-Feeney analysis, 20 5 stating:
[W]e find the reasoning of the district court in Penny-Feeney unper-
suasive. First, it is difficult to say one voluntarily vents heat waste in
the same way that one disposes of garbage. Heat, unlike garbage,
automatically leaves a person's home without any deliberate partici-
pation by the homeowner. Even if some heat is vented to the
outside, as in Penny-Feeney, the device detects all heat leaving the
home, not just the heat directed out through the vent .... [I]t is
difficult to say one should expect other people to use sophisticated
infrared instruments on one's home to view so-called heat waste....
[T]he only way for a person to avoid the risk of exposure in this case,
and in Penny-Feeney, would be to turn off all heat sources in the
home, even in sub-zero temperatures. 20 6
The court further argued:
The only value of the so-called heat waste is what it discloses about
the interior of the home. The infrared device produces an image of
the interior of the home that otherwise is protected by the home's
walls. In this sense, the infrared thermal device allows the govern-
ment to intrude into the defendant's home and gather information
about what occurs there. A resident has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in what occurs within the home, "a location not open to vis-
ual surveillance." It is this reasonable expectation of privacy in the
home that is violated by warrantless infrared surveillance, not the
expectation of privacy in "heat waste" as the Penny-Feeney court
asserts. 20 7
The court noted that heat does not resemble garbage because people
do not voluntarily vent heat like they dispose of garbage and because




203. See id. at 594.
204. See Young, 867 P.2d at 601.
205. See id. at 602-03.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
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heat reveals information about the interior of the home.20 8 The court was
concerned that FLIRs indiscriminately pick up any heat emissions and
scans neighboring houses, a broader range than many other devices.
FLIRs also search the home, a place in which the courts have commonly
found that a person has the highest expectation of privacy.20 9
The court in Young also held that Katz was not concerned with the
expectation of privacy in the technical item intercepted, but with the ex-
pectation of privacy in the basic activity in which the defendant was en-
gaged.210 The court also ruled that the Penny-Feeney line of cases
incorrectly separated the information that the police gained about the ac-
tivity inside of the home from the heat that the activity generated.211 The
court attacked the "waste heat" distinction and held that defendants have
at least as much of an expectation that the government will not detect
information about the interior of the defendants' houses or places of busi-
ness. 212 The Young court made it clear that it is incorrect to characterize
FLIRs as passive, non-intrusive instruments, especially when aimed at an
individual's home.
V. A BRAVE NEW WORLD: CAN PRIVACY BE PROTECTED?
Can privacy be protected under the present state of warrantless trash
seizures and of warrantless infrared surveillance? The police and other
law enforcement officials have been given a great deal of discretion to
perform such warrantless searches. Some might argue that the police and
other law enforcement officials are just doing their job and arresting drug
dealers. Some might further argue that they have nothing to hide, so
what's the big deal with what the police are doing? The big deal is the
evisceration of the Fourth Amendment's purpose as a protector of the
privacy interests of ordinary, law-abiding citizens. If we give police this
much discretion to use technologically advanced play tools to arrest drug
dealers at all costs, then will we sacrifice our right to carry on our private
lives freely, openly, and spontaneously? Are we really comfortable open-
ing that door and allowing the government to observe us at any time and
in any place?
Although these searches have thus far been confined to the realm of
drug smugglers, will the courts continue to uphold the distinction they
have drawn when it comes to the home, our refuge of privacy? Will the
courts tread softly on the Fourth Amendment in the name of the "war on
drugs" or will they trample our right to privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment? The courts have been extremely reluctant to allow such warrant-
less searches of an individual's home, but will that barrier hold up in our
world of ever-increasing technological sophistication? Will the courts
208. See id. at 602-03.
209. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
210. See id. at 351-52.
211. See Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03.
212. See id. at 603-04.
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continue to carefully observe the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment or will our privacy considerations become inconsequential as the
police gain more and more technological play toys? Will the courts
strengthen the constitutional right to privacy? That remains to be seen.
For now, I conclude with the forceful dissenting opinion in State v. Cos-
tin,213 which considered the big picture of what warrantless searches and
seizures mean for United States citizens. The dissent voiced its concern
over the erosion of the right to privacy by stating:
George Orwell's bleak and chilling vision of post-modern civilization
has not come to pass, at least not in this country. But allowing police
agents to set up surreptitious, twenty-four-hour video surveillance of
landowners on their own property without judicial oversight raises
the specter of such a society. Indeed, the use of technological ad-
vances to enhance government surveillance techniques threatens to
erode the expectations of privacy we take for granted in a free and
open society. Today's decision undermines the lone bulwark against
such erosion-[the] warrant requirement.2 14
213. 720 A.2d 866 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 871.
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